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The Oceanic Feeling in Painterly Creativity
  Jussi Antti Saarinen 
Abstract
The oceanic feeling is a frequent topic of discussion in both
creativity research and aesthetics.  Characterized by a
sensation of self-boundary dissolution, the feeling has been
reported to involve experiences of fusion with various objects,
including works of art.  In this article, I discuss the oceanic
feeling in the specific context of painterly creativity.  I begin by
arguing that the oceanic feeling cannot be classified as an
emotion, mood, or bodily feeling, in the established definitions
of these terms.  I then introduce philosopher Matthew
Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings to help formulate a
more accurate view of the oceanic feeling. Specifically, I
suggest that oceanic feelings should be classified as shifts in
existential feeling.  In conclusion, I briefly discuss the
implications of my account of the oceanic feeling for the more
general pursuits of painterly creativity and artistic self-
transformation.
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1. Introduction
Painting can be an intensely affective affair.  During the course
of the creative process, it is not unusual for the artist to feel
apprehensive about producing something unsatisfactory,
frustrated by seemingly insoluble problems of color and
composition, irritated by unsolicited interruptions, enchanted
by the developing work at hand, delighted about creating
something new and surprising, somber about surrendering the
finished work of art, and, in the end, proud of the final
achievement.  States such as these are commonly classified as
emotions.  Like all emotions, they are intentional states
directed towards fairly specific objects in the world:  things,
the self, other persons, events, actions, or states of affairs. 
Sometimes the intentional objects of affective states are not
clearly specifiable and may also be experienced as vague or
unfocused.  One may, for instance, feel angry at everything or
nothing in particular.  States that take on somewhat unspecific
intentional objects may be classified as moods.  In the
painterly context, a moderate mood of hypomania, for
example, is often felt as carrying the creative process forward,
whereas a dejected mood can make the slightest of setbacks
feel overwhelming, perhaps dealing a fatal blow to the entire
endeavor.  Finally, the intentionality of an affective state may
be directed exclusively towards one’s body or part(s) of it.
 After hours of demanding work, the painter may feel sore in
the joints, tired in the eyes, and heavy in the legs.  Such
states can in turn be classified as bodily feelings.[1]
With these distinctions in mind, let us consider two first-person
descriptions of a special type of feeling in the painterly
context.  In the first description, artist Stephen Newton
describes a sudden change in experience while working on a
collage:
I began to paint at the top right hand corner…
and was moving downwards when the vertical
canvas seemed to slide down to a horizontal
position. Suddenly and inexplicably, I found
myself at the centre of an endless grey sea, with
its surface covered as far as the eye could see
with floating fragments or flotsam of canvas
collage, scraps of line, painted and glued canvas,
all rising and falling around my person half
submerged at the centre of its infinity.  I was not
in any way fearful of drowning, being
overwhelmed or lost; rather the experience was
to be expected and welcomed and, at that time,
didn’t take me by surprise.  When I was once
again deposited on dry land, the painting had
been completed.[2]
In the second description, philosopher and painter Michael
Krausz recounts a life-changing experience amidst a series of
large abstract canvases painted by his friend:  “I suddenly
experienced myself in the space of the work instead of looking
at it.  More than that:  I experienced an ‘interpenetration’ of
my self and the space of the painting. In that space, I
suddenly became much more highly visually sensitive – to
spatial relations, coloration and more.”[3]  As a consequence
of this experience, Krausz developed an “inner necessity” to
paint, and confirms that these kinds of “non-dualistic”
experiences continue to affect his creative work.[4]
At first view, such feelings of self-boundary dissolution and
fusion with the artwork at hand may appear outlandish. A
closer look at writings on both artistic creativity and aesthetic
experience suggests that these kinds of feelings may be fairly
common.[5]  As expected, the concepts and tropes used to
describe such experiences are rich and varied.  Even so, the
depictions tend to point to a common experiential core.  As
Krausz observes, “[C]haracterizations of nondualistic
experiences might deploy such metaphors as ‘interpenetration’
of subject and object, or ‘fusion’ of artist and work, or
‘overcoming’, or ‘dissolving’, or ‘transcending’ such binary
opposites as subjective and objective reality.  All these idioms
suggest that, under particular circumstances, sharp distinctions
between such binary terms as self and other, or subject and
object, are undone.”[6]  Krausz also points out how these
states have been variously designated as “nirvanic, epiphanic,
numinous, religious, flow, ecstatic, or oceanic” depending on
one’s preferred orientation.[7]  Since I have become
theoretically acquainted with the phenomenon through the
psychoanalytical tradition, I use the oceanic feeling as my
term of choice.[8]
However, I do not discuss the oceanic feeling in
psychoanalytical terms.  Instead, I  draw on contemporary
philosophy of emotion to improve our understanding of the
feeling and its occurrence in painterly creativity.  To begin, I
discuss the question of taxonomy.  Can the oceanic feeling be
adequately classified as an emotion, mood, or bodily feeling?
 I examine each possibility in turn and argue that these
affective categories do not suffice in grasping the essence of
the oceanic feeling.  This analysis also serves to highlight the
complex matter of intentionality in oceanic feeling.  In order to
classify the oceanic feeling more accurately and to provide a
plausible account of its intentional structure, I next introduce
philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe’s notion of existential feelings.
 More specifically, I argue that oceanic feelings should be
viewed as significant shifts in existential feeling.  To conclude,
I discuss some of the implications my account of the oceanic
feeling has for the more general understanding of painterly
creativity.
2. The oceanic feeling:  emotion, mood, or bodily
feeling?
Let us begin with a definition.  I maintain that the defining
feature of the oceanic feeling is a feeling of dissolution of the
psychological and sensory boundaries of the self.  From this
point of view, any feeling of fusion, merger, or oneness with a
given object, such as  a work of art, is a secondary and
contingent feature of the oceanic feeling rather than its
primary distinctive property.  This is because any feeling of
fusion, merger, or oneness presupposes a feeling of self-
boundary dissolution, even if the latter does not necessarily
lead to the former.  On that account, if we were to classify the
oceanic feeling as an emotion, we might consider it to be one
type of feeling of dissolution, distinguished by its characteristic
object, the self, just as acrophobia is a type of fear that is
distinguished by its characteristic object, high places.  Positing
the self as the intentional object of the oceanic feeling is a
plausible option, as this is the case in various self-referential
emotions like shame and self-pity.[9]  If we commit to this
option, the intentional object of the oceanic feeling could be
further specified as a particular aspect of the self, namely its
psychological and sensory boundaries.  The oceanic feeling
could then be classified as an emotion in which the feeling of
dissolution is directed towards the boundaries of the self.
I consider this option somewhat contrived and
phenomenologically insufficient.  Even though the oceanic
feeling undeniably concerns the self, it does so in a much
more comprehensive and fundamental sense than mere self-
referential emotion allows for.  Whereas self-referential
emotions represent a particular intentional object within the
world (the self) in a relatively selective, evaluative, and
focused light, as, for example, shameful, guilty, or pitiful, the
oceanic feeling seems to constitute an all-embracing sense of
a certain kind of world.  Simply put, the oceanic feeling does
not just represent the self or one of its features under a
limited affective aspect; it discloses the world, including the
self, its boundaries, and its relations to other objects in a more
constitutive way.
Therefore, if we regard the oceanic feeling as a world-
disclosing feeling, classifying it as a mood rather than an
emotion becomes a reasonable option.  On the view that
moods are distinguishable from emotions due to the unfocused
nature of their intentional objects, one could argue that the
world is a sufficiently vague intentional object to warrant the
classification of the oceanic feeling as a mood.  Indeed, the
philosopher Peter Goldie has chosen this line of reasoning in
classifying the oceanic feeling as a feeling (mood) of oneness
that takes as its intentional object the universe as a
whole.[10]
My understanding of the oceanic feeling differs from Goldie’s
view in two crucial respects.  First, as stated above, I regard
any feeling of oneness occurring in conjunction with the
oceanic feeling as a secondary and contingent feature of the
oceanic feeling, not as its primary distinctive feature. Second,
and more importantly for the matter of mood, the sense in
which I refer to a world that is disclosed in oceanic feeling
differs from the sense in which Goldie designates the universe
as its intentional object of feeling.  Certainly we may have
various different intentional attitudes towards the world and
the universe, with ‘world’ and ‘universe’ taking on many
possible meanings, both literal and figurative.  One may, for
instance, believe that the world, in a concrete sense, consists
of atoms; feel awe at the vastness of the universe, in an
abstract or theoretical sense; or desire that the world, in an
experiential, subjective sense, come to an end.  However, by
‘world,’ I refer to a pre-given experiential space of meaning
and possibility that each of us already necessarily inhabits.
 This world is a world of practical engagement we are
immersed in, rather than an objectified world we feel or think
towards.  In sum,  the world in the present sense is not an
unspecific intentional object of feeling but a space of possibility
that is constituted and disclosed by the oceanic feeling in a
particular way.  For this reason, the oceanic feeling should not
be classified as a mood or a generalized emotion.
Finally, one may ask whether the oceanic feeling might simply
be a bodily feeling.  One could argue that the sense of a self,
including its psychological and sensory boundaries, is
developmentally established through bodily interaction with
one’s caretakers and is therefore fundamentally bodily in
nature.  On that account, the feeling of dissolution could be
understood as directed towards an aspect of the body or bodily
self.  Viewed in this light, the oceanic feeling could be
classified as a kind of disturbance in bodily awareness.  I
believe this is a step in the right direction.
Yet, even if the sense of self-boundaries is essentially bodily, I
maintain that the feeling of boundary dissolution is not a
bodily feeling in the restricted meaning of the term. That is, it
is not a feeling of the condition of the body exclusively or of a
change therein, like a racing heart or the sudden appearance
of goose bumps.  As with self-referential emotions, the oceanic
feeling appears to concern the self, its boundaries, and its
relation to the world in a much more fundamental and
comprehensive way.  In effect, it seems to constitute a
particular kind of self-world relation.  Thus the claim that the
oceanic feeling takes as its exclusive intentional object the
body or its parts is too narrow in scope.
To summarize, I have sought to demonstrate the insufficiency
of the concepts of emotion, mood, and bodily feeling in
accounting for the oceanic feeling.  This analysis has also
served to foreground the complex question of intentionality in
its proper classification.  Interestingly, the descriptions given
by Newton, Krausz, and others suggest that the oceanic
feeling may well be a significant change in one’s overall
existential state or feeling of being rather than a feeling
directed towards the world or any of its objects. Perhaps an
alternative approach is therefore in order.  Could the oceanic
feeling instead be classified as a type of affective state that
does not intrinsically contain intentionality?  Could it provide
intentional states with certain kinds of directedness, rather
than being intentionally directed itself? In the next section, I
pursue this line of argument.
3. The oceanic feeling as a shift in existential feeling
I have set forth the idea that the oceanic feeling belongs to a
group of affective states that constitutes an overall feeling of
being and thus discloses the world to us in a pre-given way.
 How, then, should we identify and designate this distinct class
of affective states?  I believe philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe’s
notion of existential feelings can help delineate the
phenomenon more accurately.[11]  Ratcliffe maintains that
feelings can be classified as existential in virtue of two shared
properties.  First, they are pre-intentional background feelings
that structure experience as a whole.  As such, they are
distinguishable from intentional states directed at objects
within the world. Ratcliffe frequently depicts existential feelings
as “ways of finding ourselves in the world” that constrain the
kinds of experience we are capable of having.  Indeed, he
chooses the attributive ‘existential’ to accentuate that the
feelings in question constitute our changeable sense of reality
and of our belonging to and relating to the world.  In sum,
existential feelings provide us with a pre-intentional sense of
possibility and meaning, and structure our intentional feeling
and thinking accordingly.
The second necessary property of existential feelings is that
they are bodily feelings.  As I suggested above, characterizing
the oceanic feeling in bodily terms is a step in the right
direction.  However, taking this step requires that we
recognize that feelings can be bodily in various ways.  To
clarify the particular sense in which existential feelings are
bodily, Ratcliffe has introduced a tripartite distinction between
noematic, noetic, and existential bodily feelings.[12]  He
designates as noematic those bodily feelings that are of the
body or its parts.  These are the kind of bodily feelings I have
discussed above, that is, feelings that have the body as their
exclusive intentional object.  Simply put, noematic feelings
refer to the felt body. But, as Ratcliffe notes, we do not
generally experience our bodies as sealed containers, with
some experiences falling neatly on the inside and others on
the outside.[13] Moreover, bodily feelings need not necessarily
be phenomenologically conspicuous, that is, objects of our
conscious experience. On this account, the body can also be
understood as the feeling body:  a medium for world-directed
experience.
In noetic feelings, then, the body is that through which objects
other than the body are experienced.  Even though the body is
not necessarily an object of attention in noetic feelings, it
contributes to emotional experience through a kind of
background awareness.  In short, noetic feelings are
incorporated in intentionality directed beyond the body, yet
through the body.[14]  For example, when the activity of
painting flows effortlessly, the painter’s attention will
presumably be directed towards the world, primarily on the
painting being worked on.  That focus might be on the mixing
of colors; on the way the paint spreads over the canvas; on
the emergence of form and contrast; and so on.  Even so,
concurrent bodily feelings of openness, alertness, and
responsiveness are likely to provide the situation with a sense
of fluidity and ease.  In this way, noetic feelings are
incorporated into the experience of the painting as pleasingly
receptive to one’s painterly gestures.  In contrast to this, a
painter may feel increasingly frustrated by a formal or material
problem in his or her work.[15]  An attentional shift toward
the body may then make the painter aware of a physical
feeling of being stuck or of being weighed down and confined
by the work at hand.  Such noetic feelings, in turn, contribute
to experiencing the painting as resistant and overbearing.  In
this situation, the painter might seek some fresh air to clear
his or her head or a stretch of the limbs to break the deadlock.
Finally, existential bodily feelings constitute a more
fundamental and all-encompassing feeling of being. Following
Merleau-Ponty, Ratcliffe maintains that the lived body is not
only directed at things in the world; it also opens up a pre-
objective view of the world as a space of purposive, practical
activity.[16]  Unlike the other two bodily feelings, existential
feelings cannot be classified as intentional states directed
either towards the body or the world beyond its boundaries.
 Instead, they provide us with a bodily backdrop to overall
experience, determining the parameters within which noetic
feelings are incorporated into particular emotions and moods. 
Simply put, existential feelings establish a pre-intentional
orientation to the world, whereas noetic feelings are
incorporated in feelings towards objects within such a world.
Perhaps an example can serve to clarify the firm connection
between pre-intentional existential feelings and intentional
affective states.  Consider feeling enthusiastic about painting
and enjoying it on a regular basis.  Feeling such enthusiasm
and joy towards the activity presupposes that one already
inhabits a world in which experiencing things as interesting
and enjoyable is an actual possibility.  This disposition cannot,
however, be taken for granted.  Indeed, someone who is
deeply depressed lives in a world completely devoid of such
possibilities, where, everything feels fundamentally and
inescapably lacking in interest and joy.  This is not an emotion
directed towards a situation; it is the situation.  In sum, the
depressive existential feeling forms a frame through which the
world is experienced as constricted, bereft of significance and
vitality, and lacking in certain experiential possibilities.[17]
Even though existential feelings generally remain in the
background of our experience, they may under certain
conditions become objects of attention and rational reflection.
 Usually this happens when a significant change or shift in the
existential feeling occurs, and the orientation one previously
took for granted becomes conspicuous in its absence.  As
Ratcliffe notes, it is changes in existential feeling that uncover
their contribution to experience and thus reveal the
contingency of our prior orientations.[18] Such changes may
be experienced as positive or negative.  For example, Ratcliffe
observes how in religious conversion experiences “a world that
is drained of life… can be shaken up to reveal a different and
wider space of possibility, something more, something
greater.”[19]  The opposite holds true in transitions into
pathological states, such as psychosis and depression, in which
the experiential world is characterized by a sense of loss of
connection to other people, life, and shared reality.
On that account, I maintain that oceanic feelings of self-
boundary dissolution are significant shifts in existential feeling.
 Ordinarily, we experience ourselves as distinct from other
people and things, even if there is individual variation in the
felt permeability of self-boundaries.  In fact, most forms of
everyday human interaction require us to experience the
boundaries between things, people, and ourselves as relatively
fixed and stable.  The oceanic feeling is a sudden and often
very momentous change in this common existential
orientation.  Simply put, the felt dissolution of the
psychological and sensory boundaries of the self disrupts the
taken-for-granted sense of reality and substitutes it
temporarily with one that is thoroughly different in kind.
What, then, does such an oceanic existential shift consist in? I
believe there are two experiential options available.  First, that
 oceanic shifts in existential feeling are experienced as devoid
of any ascribable intentional object, and second, that they are
experienced as involving an intentional object, either real or
imagined.  In the former case, the shift dispenses with specific
intentional relatedness to one’s surroundings and, hence, does
not amount to a feeling of oneness or fusion with any
particular objects.  For lack of a better term, we may call such
cases diffuse or pure oceanic feelings.  The philosopher André
Comte-Sponville has encapsulated this orientation succinctly
by describing his own oceanic experience as “an immanence, a
unity, an immersion, an insideness.”[20]  He continues:  “The
ego had vanished:  no more separation or representation, only
the silent presentation of everything.  No more value
judgments; only reality.  No more time; only the present.  No
more nothingness; only being.”[21]  In the second case, the
experience of self-boundary dissolution is accompanied by
intentional directedness towards particular objects.  Indeed, I
believe that all cases of self-boundary dissolution that do
involve an intentional object necessarily entail a feeling of
fusion or oneness with that object, seeing as the boundaries
between the self and the object are experienced as dissipated.
 Still, it is important to recognize that without a fundamental
shift in how one’s self-world relations are pre-intentionally
structured, the feeling of oneness with a particular intentional
object could not come about in the first place.
Given the above, the experience of fusion with a work of art
can be viewed as one possible upshot of the oceanic shift in
existential feeling.  This is not a particularly surprising outcome
of the oceanic feeling in the painterly context. Indeed, it can
be expected that the feeling of merger will be directed at the
object one is intently engaged with during the moment of self-
boundary dissolution.  Newton, for instance, has described his
oceanic experience as involving a “peculiar sensation of
envelopment… [in which] the whole womb of the painting
draws you into itself in a total engulfment… [resulting in a] loss
of self in this mystical union.”[22]  The art pedagogue and
critic Anton Ehrenzweig has similarly noted how, in the oceanic
state, “the artist feels at one with his work, not unlike the
nursling on his mother’s breast who feels at one with his
mother.”[23]  In sum, it is within the context of a pre-
intentional oceanic shift that the feeling of fusion with the
particular intentional object, the painting, is experienced.
4. Conclusion
Painterly creativity does not depend on shifts in existential
feeling, nor do such shifts necessarily entail creative results,
even within the context of creative activity.  Even so, painting
is an activity that may induce changes in existential feeling
and, as such, can raise into conscious awareness the role
existential feelings play in structuring overall experience. This
means that existential feelings may also become one of the
actual objects of creative work:  that which is worked on in
painting.  Simply put, artistic work need not merely aim at
producing artworks; it can also involve the conscious
reorganization of one’s existential orientation.  In this sense,
changes in existential feeling may lead to a wider artistic
process of self-transformation, that is, to a restructuring of
one’s fundamental relations with oneself, others, and the
world.
Viewed in this light, the oceanic feeling presents itself as a
rather special phenomenon.  As a sudden and significant shift
in existential feeling, it tends to have a momentous impact on
one’s overall take on reality.  Indeed, many artists have voiced
the transformative effect it has had on both their creative
abilities and their overall existential orientations.  Consider, for
example, psychoanalyst and artist Marion Milner’s first-person
recollection of her oceanic experience:
[I] had discovered in painting a bit of experience
that made all other occupations unimportant by
comparison.  It was the discovery that when
painting something from nature there occurred,
at least sometimes, a fusion into a never-before-
known wholeness; not only were the object and
oneself no longer felt to be separate, but neither
were thought and sensation and feeling and
action.  All one’s visual perceptions of colour,
shape, texture, weight, as well as thought and
memory, ideas about the object and action
towards it, the movement of one’s hand together
with the feeling of delight in the “thusness” of the
thing, they all seemed fused into a wholeness of
being which was different from anything else that
had ever happened to me.[24]
Milner tellingly describes her experience as “a discovery of a
different way of being,” and asks, “[W]as it not also possible
that this different sense of self that grew out of creative
concentration had bearings upon one’s relation to the whole
mass of other selves that one was in contact with?”[25]
In the same vein, Michael Krausz has noted how the oceanic
experience can be “an ingredient of a creative life journey, a
part of a larger project of self-transformation.”[26]  He
elaborates:  “As a consequence of my nondualistic experience…
I now experience more clearly, more expansively, more richly,
more perspicuously.  Such changes in my ways of experiencing
in turn affect what I produce. What I produce has affected my
ways of experiencing.  I think of my art-making as a process
in which who I am is enriched and transformed. In short, my
art-production fosters my self-transformation, and my self-
transformation fosters my art-production.”[27]
In conclusion, it appears that oceanic feelings can play an
important role in enhancing artistic creativity and, in a more
general sense, creative living.  I presume this is largely due to
their ability to emancipate the artist from habitual, common-
sense ways of experiencing self-other boundaries. Moreover,
they may provide us with a brief yet alluring glimpse into a
more flexible reality, and thus confront us with fundamental
existential questions of what is inner/outer, self/not-self, and
body/world. Embracing these questions creatively may well
become the work of a lifetime.[28]
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